Thinking about how other people represent objects in the world around them is thought to require deliberate effort. In recent years, interactive ''joint action" paradigms have shown how social context can affect our cognitive processing. We tested whether people would represent their partner's point of view in a simple team game. Participants played a game in which they had to judge the magnitude of a number either sat alone, or opposite a partner. Importantly they were never asked to judge their partner's point of view. Remarkably, when playing the game as a team, people were better when their partner happened to share their view of the number, such as when seeing a number 8, than when their partner viewed the number to be different, such as when seeing a number 6 that looked like a number 9 to their partner. In two further experiments, we identified the conditions under which the effect was present. Experiment two showed that the effect was only present after observing the prior involvement of one's partner in the task. Experiment 3, showed that the aspect of the stimulus (its magnitude) that participants were sensitive to did not need to be the aspect of the stimulus to which their partner was paying attention.
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Introduction
Human beings have evolved to live in complex social worlds and we rely on our ability to cooperate to achieve common goals (Tomasello, 2008) . We are naturally predisposed towards teaching and learning important information from others (Csibra & Gergely, 2009 ) and show continued sensitivity to their belief-like states from infancy (Kovacs, Teglas, & Endress, 2010; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Schneider, Bayliss, Becker, & Dux, 2012) . These propositions imply a sensitivity to the points of view of other people, which under some circumstances may be detrimental to focusing on our own perspective. Research on joint action has focussed on how we incorporate another's goals with our own (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003) . Research on perspective-taking has focussed on how we represent the perspectives of others when they are different from our own (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003; Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Scott, 2010) . In this paper, we combine these strands and use an interactive task to test whether we compute other people's perspectives even when there is no explicit goal to do so. The rationale behind this is that if joint task contexts predispose us to be aware of other people's perspectives, it should affect us regardless of whether we have an explicit goal to take into account how they see the world.
Perspective-taking
Even if two people jointly attend to a single object, they may see the object in different ways (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956 ). Developmental psychologists consider this to be level-2 perspectivetaking, as distinct from level-1 perspective taking, which is the ability to know if another person can see a given object or not (Flavell et al., 1981; Masangkay et al., 1974) . The distinction between level-1 and level-2 perspective-taking has regularly been proposed to mark a significant landmark in our perspective-taking abilities (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Flavell et al., 1981; Surtees, Apperly & Samson, 2016; Surtees, Butterfill, & Apperly, 2012) . Children's level-2 perspective-taking develops relatively late, at around the age of 4 (Flavell et al., 1981; Masangkay et al., 1974 ). Interestingly, level-2 abilities develop at the same age at which children first begin to understand about false beliefs on standard tasks (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and the difference between appearance http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.01.014 0010-0277/Ó 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
